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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
This paper deals with the legal and operational structures of banking groups in the Eurozone in order 
to assess the impact of such structures upon banks’ resolvability.  
 
The very definition of banking group is contentious. At the EU level, the only clear reference to a 
“banking group” can be found in recital 48 of Directive No. 36 of 2013 which states that banking 
groups are comprised of several banking entities (parent undertakings, subsidiaries and branches), 
with diversified activities where parent undertakings control at least one subsidiary. Furthermore, 
banking groups vary their structure according to their business practices and their operations in 
different jurisdictions. The terms “group” and “conglomerate” can be used interchangeably. 
 
Our preliminary analysis has focused on the 129 significant banking groups supervised by the ECB 
and provides an insight into the complexity and multidimensional nature of the supervision and 
monitoring of banking groups within the framework of the SSM. We consider the data available from 
those 129 groups under a tri-dimensional taxonomy, considering their institutional organizational, 
and operational structure.  
 
In terms of the organisational dimension, more data and research are needed on the definition (i.e. 
holding companies), and on the number and granular balance sheet data on the branches and 
subsidiaries country by country. For the operational dimension, more data and research are needed 
on the core business lines and critical functions. 
 
We discuss the framework for resolution and identify impediments to resolvability in accordance with 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
Regulation.  
 
Since supervision and crisis management are part of a seamless process, the relationship between the 
SSM (as supervisor with some crisis management responsibilities such as early intervention and 
recovery plans) and the SRM is essential at the critical point of early intervention. This requires timely 
communication and exchange of information (pre-planning), as well as coordination between 
supervisory and resolution authorities. 
 
The starting point of any possible resolution strategy planned ex ante would be the choice between a 
single point of entry (SPE) or a multiple point of entry (MPE). Already in the resolution plan the SRB 
will have to indicate which resolution tool, or combination thereof, to use. For instance, the authority 
would want to activate the bail in tool, the asset separation tool, the bridge institution or the sale of 
business tool. In practice, the Board will have to indicate «a detailed description of the different 
resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the 
applicable timescales» (art 8(9)(j) SRM Regulation). 
 
To ensure the continuity of critical economic functions carried out by the group entities, where they 
can be easily separated in a timely manner or by other means, should be one of the key guiding 
principles in the resolvability assessment of banking groups. 
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1. INTRODUCTION – DEFINITIONAL ISSUES AND TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE 
 
This paper was requested by the European Parliament under the supervision of its Economic 
Governance Support Unit. 
 
Under EU law the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation EU No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013) has 
clarified that the SSM supervises significant institutions. The test of significance is open-ended 
though some criteria are established in Article 6.4 of the SSM Regulation: if the balance sheet total 
exceeds either 20% of the GDP of its Member State or 30 billion Euros, if the entity is of significant 
relevance for the domestic economy, if the credit institution has received financial assistance from 
the ESFS and ESM. The procedures for classifying entities as ‘significant’ are outlined in Articles 43-
44 of the SSM Framework Regulation (Regulation EU No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank) 
adopted on 16 April 2014. 
 
The list of significant institutions was first published in September 2014 in accordance with 
Article 49(1) of the SSM Framework Regulation. The latest list of 129 significant supervised entities 
was published in May 20161. 
 
The jurisdictional scope of the SRM Regulation is aligned with the SSM Regulation, i.e. the 
institutions subject to the SSM supervision in the participating Member States are also subject to the 
SRM regulation. However, the SRM is not limited to the “significant” institutions, which are directly 
supervised by the ECB; “less significant” institutions shall also fall under the scope of the SRM. The 
SRM applies to the resolution of: 1) credit institutions; 2) parent undertakings established in one of 
the participating Member States, including financial holding companies and mixed financial holding 
companies when subject to consolidated supervision carried out by the ECB; 3) investment firms and 
financial institutions established in participating Member States when they are covered by the 
consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking carried out by the ECB. 
 
The relationship between the SSM and the SRM can be controversial at the critical point of early 
intervention. Since early intervention is an SSM task the transition from early intervention and 
recovery plans to resolution plans is fundamental and a key variable in assessing resolvability. 
 
According to Article 6a of the SRM Regulation, the SRB will be responsible for drawing up resolution 
plans and adopting resolution decisions for those institutions that are directly supervised by the ECB 
under the SSM Regulation, while the national resolution authorities will remain responsible for other 
entities, except where resolution scheme is expected to use the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
However, this does not prevent the SRB from intervening when it is “necessary to ensure consistent 
application of high resolution standards”. The SRB shall also have certain investigatory powers that 
it can exercise either directly or through the ECB or the national authorities. For example, the SRB is 
empowered: 1) to request information from the institutions subject to the SRM Regulation, their 
employees, and third parties to whom these entities outsourced functions or activities; 2) conduct all 
necessary investigations (including access to all necessary documents and records, and the possibility 
to obtain explanations from the employees); and 3) conduct on-site inspections. The SRB shall also 
have limited powers to penalize institutions to address infringements and non-compliance with the 
SRB decisions. In this regard the SRB can take decisions to either impose fines or periodic penalty 
payments. 
  
  
                                                 
1 Available here 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/list_of_supervised_entities_20160531en.pdf?496fcf1d1a3add
48ded49e7db0e9f3e6 
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2. BANKING GROUPS: WHAT THEY ARE AND HOW THEY OPERATE 
 
International banking groups have grown in recent years as a result of the trend towards consolidation 
of the financial industry on the one hand, and the demise of geographic barriers on the other hand. 
The legal arrangements with regard to the supervision and crisis management (including resolution) 
of such groups or conglomerates present a number of challenges for regulators, supervisors and 
policy-makers. There is first the cross-sector dimension, i.e. the different lines of business (banking, 
securities, insurance) that will allow to distinguish a financial conglomerate from a banking group or 
conglomerate. But there is also the legal separateness and cross-jurisdiction dimension, since 
international financial conglomerates operate in different jurisdictions.  
 
According to the Tripartite Group of Bank, Insurance and Securities Regulators, a financial 
conglomerate is defined as “any group of companies under common control whose exclusive or 
predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two different financial 
sectors”. A financial conglomerate may be characterised primarily as a securities, insurance or a 
banking structure. The character would be determined by the sector represented at the holding 
company level and by the type of activity that constitutes the major business of the conglomerate.  
 
A financial conglomerate involved primarily with banking would typically be one in which the parent 
company is either itself a banking institution under supervision, or is a financial holding company 
whose most dominant subsidiary is an authorised credit institution. If the major business activity is 
banking and no other services are provided in other financial sectors (i.e. insurance and/or securities) 
it will be a banking group (or conglomerate). The terms “group”2 and “conglomerate” 3 can be used 
interchangeably.  
 
The evolution of several pan-European banking groups has given rise to new structures, management 
and strategic practices that have also led to new forms of systemic risk.4 It has also evidenced that 
despite the cross border nature of such groups, governments acted unilaterally, in a number of cases, 
such as Fortis5 or the Icelandic banks6.  
 
In the EU, financial conglomerates are defined as large financial groups active in different financial 
sectors, often across borders.7 In 2002, the EU adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive in an 
effort to tighten supervision of financial conglomerates and ensure international financial groups do 
not weaken the financial system.8 For the purposes of the Conglomerate Directive, a group or 
                                                 
2 According to the Oxford Dictionary, a group is “a commercial organization consisting of several companies under 
common ownership”, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/group. 
3 According to the Oxford Dictionary, conglomerate is “a thing consisting of a number of different and distinct parts or 
items that are grouped together” available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/conglomerate.  
4 BCBS, ‘Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring’ (Bank for 
International Settlements, October 2010); Bank for International Settlements, ‘Report and Recommendations of the 
Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’ (March 2010). 
5 Sophie Limbos and Diana Phillips, ‘The Rise and Decline of a Belgian Banking Giant – Communication and Business 
Ethics in the Fortis Case’ (May 2010) University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics Working Paper 2010-009 
available at: http://anet.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/fd1e2b/10770.pdf.  
6 Arnór Sighvatsson and Gunnar Gunnarson, ‘Iceland’s financial disaster and its fiscal impact’ in John Raymond 
LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh (eds) Managing Risk in the Financial System (Edward Elgar, 
2011) 133-135. 
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/financial-conglomerates/index_en.htm.  
8 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate and 
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and 
Directives 98/78/EC and 2000/12/EC. Articles 1-2 of the Financial Conglomerates Directive have been amended by 
Directive 2011/89/EU in which “group” is defined as ‘a group of undertakings which consists of a parent undertaking, 
its subsidiaries and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation, or undertakings 
linked to each other by a relationship.’ 
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subgroup will be a financial conglomerate if at least 40% of its business is financial and at least 10%, 
or failing that six billion euros of its financial business, is in each of the insurance and the combined 
banking/investment sectors.9 The Conglomerate Directive details the further requirements for an 
organisation to be considered a financial conglomerate.10 Any conglomerate, headed by a group, 
which is industrial or commercial based and has a regulated financial entity working on behalf of that 
group is known as a mixed conglomerate.11  
 
According to Article 2(14) of the Conglomerate Directive, as amended by Directive 2011/89/EU, 
‘financial conglomerate is a group or subgroup, where a regulated entity is at the head of the group 
or subgroup, or where at least one of the subsidiaries in that group or subgroup is a regulated entity’, 
and which falls into the following conditions:  
 
(1) where there is a regulated entity at the head of the group or subgroup: (a) that entity is a parent 
undertaking of an entity in the financial sector, an entity which holds a participation in an entity 
in the financial sector, or an entity linked with an entity in the financial sector by a relationship; 
(b) at least one of the entities in the group or subgroup is within the insurance sector and at least 
one is within the banking or investment services sector; and, (c) the consolidated or aggregated 
activities of the entities in the group or subgroup within the insurance sector and of the entities 
within the banking and investment services sector are both significant. 
(2) where there is no regulated entity at the head of the group or subgroup: (a) the group’s or 
subgroup’s activities occur mainly in the financial sector; (b) at least one of the entities in the 
group or subgroup is within the insurance sector and at least one is within the banking or 
investment services sector; and, (c) the consolidated or aggregated activities of the entities in the 
group or subgroup within the insurance sector and of the entities within the banking and 
investment services sector are both significant. 
 
At the EU level, the only clear reference to a banking group can be found in recital 48 of Directive 
No. 36 of 2013 which states that banking groups are comprised of several banking entities (parent 
undertakings, subsidiaries and branches) with diversified activities where parent undertakings control 
at least one subsidiary.12 
 
A financial conglomerate can be further organised under three basic organisational structures, which 
permit the combination of banking and non-banking activities. It is important to stress the difference 
between legal and functional separateness. The former implies separate legal entities with different 
management, accounting, boards of directors and capital while the latter derives from a regulatory or 
self-imposed restriction (Chinese walls) to restrain integrated provision of different financial services. 
  
                                                 
9 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary 
supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate. 
10 Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate Directive 
2002/87, article 3. 
11 European Commission, ‘Towards an EU Directive on the Prudential Supervision of Financial Conglomerates’, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/docs/consult_en.pdf. Groupe Carrefour, a French retail 
outlet specialized in food retailing is an example of a mixed conglomerate. 
12 See recital 48 of the Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
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3. INSTITUTIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE 
BANKING GROUPS 
 
In this section13 we conduct a preliminary analysis based on a tri-dimensional framework of the 129 
banking institutions14 that comply with the significance test by the ECB. We first introduce the 
framework and then we describe each of the dimensions with the data collected for the 129 banks15.  
 
3.1 Introduction of the tri-dimensional framework  
 
We introduce the framework based on three dimensions that include the institutional, organisational 
and operational of a banking group operating in the EU.  
 
Figure 1: A tri-dimensional analytical framework 
 
 
Source: Ayadi and Ouchene (2016) 
 
Each dimension corresponds to specific variables or criteria identification:  
 
 Institutional refers to the ownership structure of the parent institution. This dimension is analysed 
based on the typology of ownership structure from the Banking Business Models Monitor (Ayadi 
et al., 2015). There are five types of ownership structures that co-exist in the European banking 
market including commercial banks, which are typically shareholder-value (SHV) banks and 
cooperative, saving, public and nationalised banks which are typically stakeholder-value (STV) 
banks.  
 
 Organisational refers to the global structure of each 129 banking groups. This structure includes 
the ultimate parent institution with its subsidiaries and/or branches (see Figure 2). 
 
 Operational refers to the business model of the parent institution. This dimension is analysed based 
on the typology of the banks business model from the Banking Business Models Monitor (Ayadi 
et al. 2015). There are five models, which can be assimilated to the indicators that refer to the core 
business lines (which are assessed from an asset- liability or activity-funding mix perspectives) 
and matched with the critical functions as described by the EBA (2015). This dimension is 
analysed based on the number of subsidiaries and branches for the whole sample of 129 banking 
groups.  
                                                 
13 This section draws on Ayadi and Ouchene (2016). 
14 The sample of 129 banking institutions supervised by the ECB is extracted from the ECB’s list of supervised entities 
(ECB, 2016). 
15 See Table 5 in Annex 2 for the breakdown of the 129 banking groups per size.  
Institutional 
OrganisationalOperational 
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The preliminary analysis of the 129 systemic banking groups shows that the supervision and 
resolution of these banks is a complex and multidimensional process due to its systemic and multi-
faceted nature. Our tri-dimensional framework provides a scheme to respond to the resolution 
challenge as rightly outlined by EBA (2015) when comparing the existing recovery plans of 
significant banking institutions.  
 
“[…] there was no consistency in the specific quantitative benchmarks, and most recovery 
plans did not indicate standards pre-defined market share to determine criticality. […] The 
fact that the market for this type of service is often fragmented should also be taken into 
account. […] As a consequence, the EBA recommends that specific quantitative benchmarks 
should not be included in the assessment of the criteria above [market share].” (EBA, 2015 
p. 10).  
 
“[…] the resolution authorities should take into account the institution’ business model and 
structure (i.e. the way an institution’s business is organised, including interconnections 
between businesses) […]” (EBA, 2015 p. 15).  
 
3.2 Description of the institutional, organizational and operational structures  
 
In terms of ownership, the sample of 129 banking institutions is mainly composed of commercial 
banks (n=38) and cooperatives (n=22) as shown below in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Ownership structure of 129 banking institutions supervised by ECB 16  
 
 
 
Source: Compilation from Ayadi and Ouchene (2016) based on data in Ayadi et al (2016) 
 
From an organizational perspective, we have analysed the organisation of the 129 banking institutions 
based on two variables: number of subsidiaries and branches. The figure below shows the structure 
of the whole sample (n= 129). We have identified the countries of the subsidiaries (n=782) based on 
the number of ultimate parent institutions, the parent institutions and subsidiaries of the 129 banks’ 
sample. 596/782 subsidiaries are part of the Eurozone. These subsidiaries are located in 39 countries, 
which are either in or out of the Eurozone. Regarding the number of branches, there are 105/129 
supervised banking institutions that have branches. In addition, if we look into the 782 subsidiaries, 
these have also their own branches (n=484). Of these branches, there are 361, which are part of the 
Eurozone17.  
 
  
                                                 
16 In this sample, there are 24 banking institutions which are missing data for these variables (represented by the symbol 
‘#N/A’ in graphs).  
17 Despite the availability of the variable ‘Number of branches’ in the SNL database, there is not enough available data 
on the country or region of these branches. This would require a further research in order to identify the host country 
and the adequate supervision authority.  
38
22
17
9
19
24 Commercial bank
Cooperative bank
Nationalised bank
Public bank
Savings bank
#N/A
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Figure 3: Organisational structure of the 129 banking institutions 
 
 
 
Source: Ayadi and Ouchene (2016) 
 
In terms of the business models, we have used the definition and methodology of the BBMM Europe 
2015 by Ayadi et al. (2016). 
 
The Diversified retail (type 2) banks activities consist primarily of lending to customers, mainly using debt liabilities 
and customer deposits. Notwithstanding that the largest share of assets is allocated to customer loans, this category of 
bank obtained twice as much from trading activities than the other retail-oriented banks. They are relatively large in size 
and internationally active, as compared to the other retail-oriented banks.  
 
The Diversified retail (type 1) banks combine lending to customers with a moderate percentage of trading activities (i.e. 
31% on average) and they primarily use customer deposits. These banks are modest in size. The ownership structure is 
slightly tilted towards stakeholder value banks such as savings and cooperative banks.  
 
The focused retail banks provide traditional services, such as customer loans and are funded by customer deposits. This 
is also reflected in their income, which consists mostly of net interest income and commission and fees, while trading 
income and other income are only minor components. The share of the banks that were identified as focused retail 
remained similar during the crises. These banks have an ownership structure that is slightly tilted towards stakeholder 
value banks (cooperative and savings banks).  
 
Wholesale banks engage in interbank lending and borrowing and are mainly categorised as shareholder value banks. 
However, they also include the central institutions of cooperative and savings banks that provide liquidity and other 
services to both local banks and public banks.  
 
Investment-oriented banks engage in trading activities while relying on debt securities and derivatives for funding.  
 
Source: Ayadi et al. (2016) 
 
Ultimate Parent 
Supervised 
Institution
n= 129
Parent Supervised 
Institution
n= 53
Subsidiaries 
n= 782 
Branches 
n= 484
Branches
n= 105
NA (No Parent 
Institution) 
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Eurozone member 
subsidiaries  
n= 596 
Eurozone member 
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Figure 4 shows the type of business model according to the BBMM 2015 (Ayadi et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 4: Business model of 129 banking institutions 
 
 
 
Source: Compilation from Ayadi and Ouchene (2016) based on data in Ayadi et al (2016) 
 
As shown above, 37 supervised banks belong to the ‘Diversified retail Type 2’ and 31 supervised 
banks to the ‘Diversified retail type 1’. Followed by the other business models: ‘focused retail’ (18), 
‘Investment’ (11) and ‘Wholesale’ (8). 
 
When crossing and applying the three dimensions to the 129 banks, there are five broad models that 
can be identified based on the institutional structure which are broken down in 22 sub-models 
depending on their business models and organisational structure (See Figure 7 to 11 in Annex 2). One 
common denominator between all these models is the complexity of the overall structure. Banking 
groups that are commercial, which are typically shareholder value institutions and operationally 
investment oriented, are more involved in the capital markets where the serve critical functions such 
in the bond market, secondary market and prime brokage. These banks have thousands of branches 
in the eurozone. Others that are cooperatives and savings, which are typically stakeholder value banks 
and operationally retail banks, are very active in the real economy and retail markets. These banks 
have equally numerous branches as their commercial counterparts.  
 
It is important to notice that all these banks regardless their ownership structure and business model 
are universal banks that combine at different percentages, retail, investment and, in some instances, 
insurance activities. These percentages evolve over time that makes their overall business model and 
hence their core business and the critical functions they serve move over time in case of external 
shocks or internal reorganisation.  
 
 
  
31
3718
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8
24
Diversified retail Type 1
Diversified retail Type 2
Focused retail
Investment
Wholesale
#N/A
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4. RESOLVABILITY OF BANKING GROUPS 
 
4.1 Resolvability assessment  
 
This section considers the resolvability of banking groups, considering the tri-dimensional framework 
introduced and defined in Section 3.  
 
A. Institutional Structure 
 
Commercial private banking groups are typically organized using the legal form of public limited 
company (PLC) or société anonyme, with the main objective of profit maximization. However, in the 
light of the interests of other stakeholders beyond the interests of shareholders, notably depositors, 
there is a trend towards ring-fencing retail activities in a number of jurisdictions, including the UK, 
in order to facilitate the resolvability of banking groups. There is also a broader debate about the 
suitability of the PLC model for banking. 
 
Cooperative banks have traditionally been local, mutual and in some instances not-for-profit 
organizations.18 However, this is changing as result of policy and legislative changes at the domestic 
level. For example Italy’s recent reforms known as la riforma del Credito Cooperativo.19 Similar 
changes can be witnessed in the Netherlands where Rabobank Nederland reorganized its institutional 
structure becoming a single entity as result of the merger of 107 different legal entities and changed 
its legal name from Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. into Coöperatieve 
Rabobank U.A.20 This illustrates a current trend towards consolidation and modernisation within 
cooperatives which aim to benefit from some of the features of commercial banking groups.  
 
The case of nationalised banks (whether total or partial, permanent or temporary government 
ownership) and public banks – two other categories identified in section 3 and annex 2 – will not be 
further discussed in this section. We will not expand either on the category of ‘saving banks’ (which 
are often organized relying upon cooperative or mutual structure). These have a complex history in 
several Eurozone jurisdictions (like the Spanish ‘cajas de ahorro’ or the German ‘Sparkassen’) given 
their political and social considerations (which can also be impediments to resolvability). 
 
B. Organizational Structures 
 
As stated in section 3, the organisational criterion refers to the global structure of each of the 129 
banking groups. This structure includes the ultimate parent institution with its subsidiaries and/or 
branches. This leads to a four-fold analysis, depending on where they operate (intra or outside the 
EU) and the reliance on branches or subsidiaries.  
 
As acknowledged, the distinction between branches and subsidiaries is a legal one since branches are 
extensions of the same legal entity (the parent legal entity is the one that has legal personality) while 
subsidiaries are separate legal entities under the laws of the country of incorporation. This distinction 
has serious implications for resolvability purposes, as it does from the perspective of supervision 
(reliance on home authorities in the case of branches and host authorities in the case of subsidiaries). 
And like in the case of supervision, the trend towards consolidation is fundamental. 
                                                 
18 Under the ‘genus’ of cooperative banks there are credit unions, mutual savings banks, building socieities and 
cooperatives. 
19 Interesting examples can be drawn from ICCREA Group in Italy or Rabobank in the Netherlands. ICCREA Group is a 
network of 337 cooperative banks called Banche di Credito Cooperativo, Casse Rurali, and Casse Raiffeisen in Alto 
Adige (known as Banche di Credito Cooperativo or BCC). BCC, created a holding company to own the different lines 
of business and be able to raise capital from the markets.  
20 See Rabobank Nederland, Press Release, Rabobank General Assembly Approves new Cooperative Structure, dated 9 
december 2015, https://www.rabobank.com/en/press/search/2015/20151209_governance.html. 
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If a banking group is organized through branches, it will present a more manageable structure for the 
purposes of resolution since it is a single entity. This notwithstanding, proper consideration must be 
given to the existence of branches deemed to be “significant” and the fact that large foreign groups 
may access the single market via the establishment of a branch21.  
 
In these cases intra and extra-EU coordination might prove difficult. This might impose limitations 
if there is an attempt to resolve particular lines of business. If a separation or spin-off of certain lines 
of business within the operational structure (analysed below) is attempted, it might not be so simple 
for third parties to understand this attempt to divide between profit-making and loss-making entities 
resulting in unavoidable reputational costs.  
 
As evidence has demonstrated, market participants are not always able to differentiate between profit-
making or solvent entities and loss-making or insolvent legal entities.22 In a ‘subsidiaries’ model’ 
organizational structure, the resolvability of a banking group can result in a complex web of separate 
legal entities with or without crossed shareholdings.  
 
The use of separate legal entities is convenient for the purposes of limiting the extent/degree of the 
expansion of liability across entities of the same group; however, the counter side of this is that it 
complicates the resolvability aspect since the banking group has to deal with a web of separate legal 
entities. To this end the choice between the multiple-point-of-entry (MPE) or single-point-of-entry 
(SPE) resolution strategies is crucial.  
 
Substantial progress has been made at the EU level on domestic insolvency, but organisational 
complexity is still an unresolved issue if we are faced with a banking group simultaneously operating 
inside and outside the EU (e.g. Santander, UBS or Deutsche Bank). The latter opens fundamental 
coordination problems and can even generate conflicts with policies and priorities of different intra 
and extra-EU regulatory and supervisory agencies towards resolvability. 
 
C. Operational Structure 
 
When assessing the operational structures of banking groups, these can be classified in four to five 
additional sub-categories (i.e. besides the categorization outlined above between commercial v. 
cooperatives; branches v. subsidiaries; and, intra v. extra-EU) as was outlined previously: 
  
(1) Banking groups focused on investment activities (investment banking groups) 
(2) Banking groups focused on retail deposit taking activities (retail-focused banking groups) 
(3) Diversified banking groups types 1 and 2 combining both activities indicated before (deposit 
taking (Type 1) and market funded (Type 2) and investment banking or universal banking 
groups) and, 
(4) Wholesale banking groups.  
 
From this analysis, there are a series of permutations that can be observed, for example, the 
resolvability of a (a) commercial, shareholder-value banking group that is organised via 
subsidiaries and is focused on investment bank activities with critical functions in 
the international financial systems (custody, international payment services, etc.) and operates intra 
and extra-EU is not the same as the resolvability of (b) a banking group which is a cooperative, 
stakeholders’ oriented, organised via branches and focused on domestic retail deposit taking 
activities.  
 
                                                 
21 The recent case in which ICBC being awarded a UK bank licence provides an example of the latter case 
22 See Rosa M. Lastra and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Case of Financial Conglomerates, 
in John R. LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder Singh (eds.), Financial Crisis Management and Bank 
Resolution, Informa, 2009, pp. 276-277. 
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Rather than analysing each of the several possible scenarios—which are quite numerous (see annex 
2- Figures 7 to 11 for all possibilities), it is more practical to derive some general principles: (1) 
diversification of the operational structures (or business structures) usually goes hand-in-hand with 
an increased number of subsidiaries; (2) mono-line operational structures add to vulnerabilities if 
there happens to be a shock in the specific sector of operations as there are no additional “buffers” 
that can absorb the shock, therefore exacerbating vulnerability (same can apply to retail and wholesale 
operational structures); (3) although diversified structures seem in principle to be less prone to risk, 
they can accelerate contagion from ‘ill’ businesses to ‘healthy’ activities of the banking group (e.g. 
case of Fortis that combined banking and insurance activities prior to the banking failure); and, (4) in 
wholesale scenarios, small events can gain a concerning magnitude quite fast due to the volume 
factor.  
 
The operational structure can pose additional concerns since it does not necessarily mimic the 
institutional structure described above. Banks may be organised, inter alia, via hub-and-spoke23 (or 
master-feeder) structures and/or via business lines running across different vehicles, and different 
operational business lines of the banking group resulting in an exacerbation of risk. For example, a 
banking group’s risk and liquidity management practices may be concentrated in one subsidiary but 
this subsidiary is interconnected to all or most of the other subsidiaries in the group. A similar 
situation can be encountered in the area of cross-group IT systems. The interconnectedness of the 
group is something, which is difficult to avoid, since economies of scale are what makes the business 
model of banking groups more profitable (with all their implied benefits) but can be a multiplier when 
addressing the resolvability of the group. 
 
4.2 The legal framework 
 
This section describes the legal framework pertaining to resolution under the BRRD and the SRM 
Regulation. Obstacles to the SRB’s ability to address impediments to resolvability are highlighted. 
Since the provisions applicable to resolvability in both texts are fundamentally similar, a parallel 
analysis of the two texts will be conducted only where there are considerable differences that may 
give rise to concerns. Where necessary, reference will also be made to EBA relevant guidelines on 
the matter24.  
 
Art 5 (1) SRM Regulation establishes the SRB as the relevant national resolution authority or the 
relevant group-level resolution authority for EU based cross border groups for the application of that 
SRM Regulation and of the BRRD (Directive 2014/59/EU). 
 
The scope of the SRB is ample, even wider than the ECB supervisory remit. The SRB will have to 
adopt resolution decisions25 for the entities referred to in Article 226 that are not part of a group and 
for groups: (i) which are considered to be significant in accordance with Article 6(4) of Regulation 
                                                 
23 A hub-and-spoke structure is a common feature in investment structures where several non-core investment vehicles 
(“spokes”) pull their assets together by contributing to a central investment vehicle (“hub”). An important aspect of this 
structure is that each individual vehicle remains independent and individually managed.  
24 Specifically see EBA, Guidelines on measures to reduce or remove impediments to resolvability, EBA/GL/2014/11, 19 
December, 2014; ID, RTS on the content of resolution plans and the assessment of resolvability, EBA RTS/2014/15, 
19 December 2014; ID, Comparative report on the approach to determining critical functions and core business lines 
in recovery plans, on 6 March 2015. 
25 See article 8 of the SRB regulation.  
26 Article 2 of the SRB Regulation reads as follows: “This Regulation shall apply to the following entities: (a) credit 
institutions established in a participating Member State; (b) parent undertakings, including financial holding companies 
and mixed financial holding companies, established in a participating Member State, where they are subject to 
consolidated supervision carried out by the ECB in accordance with Article 4(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013; 
(c) investment firms and financial institutions established in a participating Member State, where they are covered by 
the consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking carried out by the ECB in accordance with Article 4(1)(g) of 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.” 
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(EU) No 1024/2013; or (ii) in relation to which the ECB has decided to exercise directly all of the 
relevant powers; and (b) other cross-border groups (emphasis added). These are defined as groups 
that have entities as referred to in Article 2 established in more than one participating Member State 
(Article 3 (24) SRM Regulation)27. 
 
The SRB may also at any time decide on its own initiative, after consulting the national resolution 
authority concerned, or upon request from the national resolution authority concerned, to exercise 
directly all of the relevant powers under the SRM Regulation also with regard to any entity or group 
which falls under the direct remit of national resolution authorities (Article 7(2), Article 7(4)(b) and 
(5) SRM Regulation). 
 
The reason why it is important to consider the SRB remit is because, for those institutions not directly 
supervised by the ECB, coordination problems may arise among the national competent authorities 
and the SRB in assessing resolvability and its possible impediments.  
 
In fact, the assessment of the resolvability of the group must be made by the SRB in consultation with 
the competent authorities, including the ECB, and the resolution authorities of non-participating 
Member States in which significant branches are located insofar as relevant to the significant branch. 
Such assessment should be carried out at the same time as the drawing up and updating of the group 
resolution plan28. 
 
The SRB shall also identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where necessary and 
proportionate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed when drawing 
up and updating the resolution plan29. 
 
As resolution authority, the SRB also has discretionary powers to address impediments to 
resolvability. However, it is worth mentioning that actions to address impediments are to be taken by 
the competent authority rather than by the SRB. Also the relevant decision making process, which 
sees the involvement of the competent authority, the ECB and, where necessary, the macro-prudential 
authority, seems convoluted. Whilst this procedure is consistent with the Meroni doctrine and is in 
line with the specific allocation of competences among authorities, it may create again a coordination 
problem.  
 
Actions to address impediments must be necessary and proportionate30. Absent any definition in the 
Regulation, one may speculate that a measure is “necessary” if it is the best viable option against all 
the alternatives, whereas the assessment of proportionality should take into account the overall impact 
this may have on the group as a whole and possibly on market infrastructure. Paragraph 46 of the 
SRM Regulation limits the Board discretion to “what is necessary to simplify the structure and 
operations of the institutions solely to improve its resolvability” and that “action should not go beyond 
the minimum necessary to attain the objectives sought”. 
 
For the purposes of Article 17 (5) BRRD31, EBA instead defines a measure as proportionate as 
follows:  
 
                                                 
27 See also par. (22) of the SRB Regulation. 
28 See article 12(4) of the BRRD and article 10 of the SRB Regulation.  
29 See article 8(6) of the SRB Regulation. Group resolution plans are drawn up by group-level resolution authorities, 
together with the resolution authorities of subsidiaries and after consulting the resolution authorities of significant 
branches insofar as is relevant to the significant branch as established by art 12 (1) BRRD. 
30 See article 8(6) of the SRM Regulation. 
31 Which indicates the possible measures the resolution authorities can impose on the entity to address impediments to 
resolvability.  
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“A measure is proportionate (…), if the overall benefits for making a liquidation in normal 
insolvency proceedings or resolution of the institution [are] feasible and credible and [if the 
overall benefits] for meeting the resolution objectives outweigh the overall costs and 
negative effects of removing the impediments to resolvability”32.  
 
As for necessity, the EBA considers that: 
 
“A measure is necessary to reach the intended goal if it is required to remove or materially 
reduce a substantive impediment to the feasible or credible implementation of the relevant 
resolution strategy, and if there are no less intrusive measures which are able to achieve the 
same objective to the same extent.”33  
 
Necessity and proportionality may be a further obstacle to group resolution as, depending on the level 
of intrusiveness, certain measures could be seen as disproportionate, hence be subject to appeal by 
the institution concerned. While the appeal does not automatically suspend the decision, it is unclear 
whether the institution will incur sanctions in case of non-compliance34. 
 
To ensure consistency across supervisory practices, EBA has issued a set of guidelines, which spell 
out further the list of possible measures that can be requested following Article 17 BRRD and the 
circumstances in which each measure can be applied35. For our purposes, one key theme seems to 
emerge from those guidelines: the problem of dealing with cross border/third counties issues 
(applicable laws, recognition of resolution proceedings and obstacles to 
termination/novation/amendment of contracts).  
 
Even if more research is needed on the degree of third country penetration of EU banking groups and 
of those single entities that fall under the SRB domain, it is reasonable to expect that the provision of 
some services to groups or sub-groups or entities that may be affected by EU resolution proceedings 
are located in non-EU countries.  
 
4.3 Resolvability issues pertaining to banking groups 
 
In what follows, we will give a bird’s eye view of impediments that are likely to appear in all or 
certain group structures. Annex 4 provides a table where specific examples are given: these are linked 
to a suggested course of action by the SRB to the evaluation of the necessity and proportionality 
requirement. 
 
A group shall be deemed to be resolvable if it is feasible and credible for the resolution authorities to 
(1) either wind up group entities under normal insolvency proceedings or (2) to resolve group entities 
by applying resolution tools and powers to group entities36. 
 
On a pragmatist approach, (1) above can always be achieved as evidenced with the insolvency of 
Lehman Brothers. However, this does not necessarily always mean that it will be economically 
efficient or that it will be self-contained (and will not spread to other entities and eventually result in 
a systemic crisis, as also evidenced by the collapse of Lehman Brothers). Therefore, (2) would almost 
inevitable be the tool of choice of the resolution authorities due to the special nature of banks. 
 
                                                 
32 See EBA guidelines on impediments to resolvability supra 24 at p. 10. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See article 85 of the SRB regulations establishes that «Any natural or legal person, including resolution authorities, 
may appeal against a decision of the Board referred to in Article 10(10), Article 11, Article 12(1), Articles 38 to 41, 
Article 65(3), Article 71 and Article 90(3) which is addressed to that person, or which is of direct and individual concern 
to that person». 
35 EBA guidelines on impediments to resolvability supra 24.  
36 See article 16 of the BRRD and article 10 of the SRB Regulation. 
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According to Article 17, paragraph 5: “ ... resolution authorities shall have the power to take any of 
the following measures: 
 
(g) require changes to legal or operational structures of the institution or any group entity, 
either directly or indirectly under its control, so as to reduce complexity in order to ensure 
that critical functions may be legally and operationally separated from other functions 
through the application of the resolution tools;  
 
(h) require an institution or a parent undertaking to set up a parent financial holding 
company in a Member State or a Union parent financial holding company; …” 
 
It seems that the required powers are vested to the resolution authorities to address any structural or 
operational impossibilities to resolve a group and maintain its critical functions. However, its 
implementation is not simple and can have risk management implications and a potential political 
cost. On the former, the main rationale for the emergence of several legal entities has mainly to do 
with reducing legal risk, which has been historically supported by the concept of separate legal entity 
in corporate law and liquidation or winding up in insolvency law. On the latter, i.e. the political cost, 
if substantial changes are required which, under the group’s view will deter its risk management or 
would have a financial impact on its return, can force the group to migrate its operations to a more 
favourable jurisdiction. In addition, a special remark should be made in regard to (h) above, since this 
would contribute towards a simpler resolvability of the group within the European Union but this still 
will not address the issue of coordination in the case of GSIBs. 
 
SRB assessment of resolvability and possible impediments to resolvability is inextricably linked to 
the preferred resolution strategy. The starting point of any possible resolution strategy planned ex 
ante would be the choice between an SPE and a MPE. This is why a possible preferred resolution 
strategy is indicated in the annex below. 
 
One of the guiding principles in resolvability assessment should be the need “to ensuring the 
continuity of critical functions carried out by the group entities, where they can be easily separated 
in a timely manner or by other means”. In their «Comparative report on the approach to determining 
critical functions and core business lines in recovery plans», EBA surveys the different definitions of 
critical functions37. All of the different definitions identify a function as critical on the basis of its 
impact on financial markets, financial stability and the real economy, on their level of substitutability 
and as a proportion of total system capacity. 
 
BRRD Annex C covers critical “operations”, rather than “functions” in the assessment of 
resolvability, however, absent any definition of critical operations in the Directive, it is likely to 
assume that the terms are used interchangeably. 
 
EBA instead laments the lack of clarity in the BRRD definition and suggests that this should be better 
defined. Specifically EBA notes how in «critical function” the term ‘functions’ means activities, 
services and operations provided to third parties and should not be determined from a merely internal 
perspective oriented at the business and organisation of the institution». EBA also notes how the 
identification of critical functions is “intrinsically linked” to the “concept of the underlying services 
that are essential to the setting up of the deliverable services, relationships or operations to third 
parties”38. Critical services are those underlying activities needed to provide one or more critical 
functions in fact. 
  
                                                 
37 See EBA Comparative report on the approach to determining critical functions and core business lines in recovery 
plans, supra 24, page 7, in footnotes 3, 4 and 5. 
38 See EBA, Technical advice on the delegated acts on critical functions and core business lines, EBA/Op/2015/05, 6 
March 2015, p. 6. 
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Against those definitional problems, banks seem to have identified critical functions mostly on the 
basis of their systemic importance and their substitutability. To this end, examples of critical functions 
are: retail and corporate deposits, retail and corporate lending, payments, clearing and settlements, 
derivatives, secondary market trading, debt capital markets and custody services.  
 
Besides the lack of a clear definition of critical functions, the SRB may encounter several problems 
when addressing impediments to resolvability. These can be divided into 4 main groups: 1) the 
inability of the bank to correctly map them39 which in turn may impact both the correct choice of 
resolution strategy and of possible alternative measures 2) the feasibility of substitutability due to 
possible legal and structural40 obstacles; 3) legal obstacles pertaining to the provisions of those 
services to third countries parties; 4) obstacles pertaining to the underlying critical services which are 
vital to the delivery of those functions (such as IT services). 
  
EBA has already expressed concerns on the ability of cross border banking groups to map their core 
business lines and critical functions41 mostly related on their identification on the basis of judgmental 
evaluation and qualitative considerations rather than being supported by quantitative information and 
objective and detailed analysis. Also EBA considers that in some cases banks may confuse critical 
functions with core business lines and there is no analysis of the relative importance of the function 
to different group entities.  
 
Also, in deciding the preferred resolution strategy (SPE or MPE), consideration should be given to 
the extent to which critical functions are integrated within the banking group and the dependency of 
material entities onto these integrated functions. SPE may be preferable in case of high level of 
integration. 
 
Further impediments to resolvability the SRB can face relate to: 
 
 Effectiveness of bail in: in case of a highly integrated domestic commercial group it is likely to 
imagine that the resolution authority would like to adopt an SPE resolution strategy. In absence of 
a pure holding company (HC), there may be obstacles to the use of the bail in tool. In fact, the 
creation of a pure holding company in an SPE resolution scenario would in principle mitigate the 
impact of resolution proceedings over the liabilities of the operational subsidiaries because the HC 
will bear the “capital liabilities”, e.g. losses will be imposed on the HC capital. Further losses will 
then be borne by the HC unsecured term debt, which will be the one to be bailed in. This will 
further shield the operational subsidiaries because the HC debt would be structurally subordinated 
to credit claims against them. From this follows that in absence of a HC questions related to the 
subordination of TLAC may arise as well. 
 
 Funding structure: the group funding structure will have to be carefully assessed against the SRB 
preferred resolution strategy and tools. For instance it has been noted42 that firms may make 
extensive use of structured notes with different structures and embedded derivatives. The correct 
evaluation of these can be difficult to make and bail in may not be possible. Another concern arises 
with the use of non-equity capital instruments by the operating firms43 issued as TLAC or MREL. 
For them to achieve the intended objective, the issuing subsidiary may have to be put into 
resolution. This may be in contrast with an SPE strategy. Also, should this type of debt be issued 
by a subsidiary incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, the powers of the SRB to bail it in may be 
                                                 
39 Supervised entities have a duty to cooperate in the drafting of the resolution plans by providing resolution authorities 
all information necessary to draw up the plans, which will include a mapping of their critical functions. See article 8 of 
the SRB Regulation. A full list of necessary information is included in annex B of the BRRD. 
40 For instance when the infrastructures needed to carry out those services are too complex to unbundle. 
41 See EBA criticisms at page 6 of the EBA comparative report on recovery planning supra 24. 
42 See Andrew Gracie, TLAC and MREL: from design to implementation, 17 July 2015, available here 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/834.aspx. 
43 Ibidem, p 5. 
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uncertain. Finally, those groups, which operate mainly via subsidiaries, may not be able to 
disentangle easily their intra-group liabilities that may in turn hamper the self-sufficiency of a legal 
entity in a resolvability scenario. Also, this may create liquidity management problems. The SRB 
should require groups to disentangle the maze and to be able to attribute funding and liquidity 
strategy at individual entity level. As a consequence, the SRB should also require the existence of 
strong internal governance mechanism, which will allow the smooth functioning of the process. 
To tackle funding problems, in the US, resolution authorities may require the creation of a clean 
holding company44, which will be banned from issuing short-term debt to external investors and 
from entering into derivatives and certain other types of financial contracts with external 
counterparties. 
 
 Maintaining critical functions in resolution: as discussed above, in a highly integrated commercial 
group, the mapping and the provision of critical functions may be hampered during resolution, 
especially because companies which provide services essential to the provision of those functions 
may be located outside the group and they may even be located abroad. To ensure continuity, one 
solution for the SRB would be to require groups to create an in house model for the delivery of 
shared services, which is able to be insulated and to operate on a stand-alone basis. Where this is 
not possible there should be inter-affiliate contractual agreements, which guarantee the provision 
of those services in resolution. 
 
 Cash and liquidity management: both domestic and international groups may adopt capital pooling 
strategies as cash and liquidity management. A cross border cash pool can take different structures 
(physical, notional or hybrid), different names (sweeping and notional), and forms (pooling per 
county or pooling per legal entity) but in essence it allows banks to concentrate in one locations 
the cash it holds in different countries, currencies and subsidiaries. However, in case of resolution 
it may be difficult to track down the original owners of the cash, i.e. the relevant entity, and the 
attributable amount. In preparing for resolvability, the SRB should require groups to map and 
reduce the level of cross border multiple cash sweeping arrangements.  
 
 Relationship with third parties: under this broad heading, we include all those types of contracts 
(ranging from premises lease to repos), which may include acceleration/termination/cross default 
clauses that may be activated in case of event of default. The relevant impediments to resolvability 
are applicable to all types of groups, with an increased level of complexity and seriousness for 
those international investment focused groups. Whereas Article 71 of the BRRD deals with 
termination rights, its remit is not absolute. Many contracts fall outside its scope, for instance those 
concluded with counterparties located in a foreign (non EU) jurisdiction and those that are not 
directly linked to a crisis prevention measure or a crisis management measure such as rights to 
terminate arising from any other default, including failure to pay or deliver margin. The SRB 
should require banks to include specific clauses in those contracts. 
 
It should also be marginally noted that in resolution, groups might face a HR problem under two 
perspectives: 1) the ability to retain key staff and 2) to comply with employment law in case of 
dismissal. The first case may be exacerbated when the key staff, while being formally employed by 
a specific legal entity, performs functions that are critical across the board. In all these cases SRB 
should require the inclusion of ad hoc provisions in the relevant contracts.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
44 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release dated 30 October 2015, available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20151030a.htm. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has discussed some key aspects related to the legal and operational structures of banking 
groups in the Eurozone in order to assess the impact of such structures upon banks’ resolvability.  
 
Our preliminary analysis has focused on the 129 significant banking groups supervised by the ECB 
and provides an insight into the complexity and multidimensional nature of the supervision and 
monitoring of banking groups within the framework of the SSM. We consider the data available from 
those 129 groups under a tri-dimensional taxonomy, considering their institutional organizational, 
and operational structure.  
 
Based upon such data and taxonomy, the paper raises a number of questions or issues as well as 
impediments to resolvability that the Single Resolution Board might consider in their assessments in 
the light of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM regulation.  
 
The paper outlines avenues for further research since greater clarity is needed to understand both the 
legal and the operational structures of banking groups in the euro area and how such structures impact 
upon their resolvability bearing in mind the need to maintain the continuity of critical economic 
functions in resolution. Banking groups may also change or adapt their structure/s in the light of 
regulatory and legislative changes (e.g. ring-fencing).   
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ANNEX 1 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Differences between a Banking Group and a Mixed/Financial Conglomerate 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Possible Overlaps among Different Financial Institutions’ Classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
25 PE 587.377 
ANNEX 2 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
(38)  
Diversified 
retail type 1 
(11) 
Diversified 
retail type 2 
(11) 
Investment 
(6) 
Focused 
(5) 
 
Wholesale 
(5) 
Branches  
(19,264) 
Subsidiaries 
(64) 
Branches* 
(43) 
Eurozone 
(19,264) 
Eurozone 
(43) 
Non-Eurozone 
(21) 
Eurozone 
(37) 
Non-
Eurozone 
(6) 
Branches  
(22,447) 
Subsidiaries 
(83) 
Eurozone 
(22,447) 
Eurozone 
(45) 
Non-Eurozone 
(38) 
Branches* 
(55) 
Eurozone 
(22) 
Non-
Eurozone 
(16) 
Branches  
(15,883) 
Subsidiaries 
(158) 
Eurozone 
(15,883) 
Eurozone 
(104) 
Non-Eurozone 
(54) 
Branches* 
(65) 
Eurozone 
(46) 
Non-
Eurozone 
(17) 
Branches 
(3,748) 
Subsidiaries 
(21) 
Branches* 
(13) 
Eurozone 
(3,748) 
Eurozone 
(8) 
Non-
Eurozone 
(5) 
Eurozone 
(12) 
Non-Eurozone 
(9) 
Branches 
(7) 
Eurozone 
(7) 
Figure 7: Commercial banks’ global structure 
 
*The number of branches corresponds to the number of 
subsidiaries which have branches in Eurozone and non-
Eurozone.  
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*The number of branches corresponds to the number of subsidiaries 
which have branches in Eurozone and non-Eurozone.  
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ANNEX 3 
 
Figure 12: Resolution Trail 
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ANNEX 4 
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